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 Part One
Normative Approaches 

 1  For a more extensive discussion, see Brems (2014). 
 2  The main ones are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (1979), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(1989), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families (1990), the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (2008). 
 2 
 Legal Pluralism as a Human Right 
and/or as a Human Rights Violation 
 EVA  BREMS 
 1. THE COMPLEX ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1 
 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS law can be analysed in terms of legal pluralism. In public opinion,  ‘ human rights ’ are often portrayed as a clear and homogenous concept. Yet those who work in the fi eld of 
human rights know that the reality is very different. A seemingly simple 
question such as  ‘ show me the list of all human rights ’ or  ‘ draft me a list of 
all human rights ’ is certain to generate as many different lists as there are 
human rights experts. Indeed, there is no such thing as a single human rights 
catalogue. Instead, human rights are found in a multitude of highly diverse 
sources. Even if we leave aside domestic legal sources and focus only on 
international human rights law, we are dealing with a complex, multilay-
ered reality. The sources and mechanisms of international human rights law 
can be differentiated along several lines. 
 In the fi rst place, sources and mechanisms can be categorised on the 
basis of the  governance level at which they operate. At the universal level, 
human rights standards have been set by the United Nations 2 and a  number 
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 3  eg Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). 
 4  eg ILO Convention No 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise, ILO Convention No 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, ILO 
 Convention No 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 
ILO Convention No 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination 
of the Worst Forms of Child Labour. 
 5  The main human rights convention of the Council of Europe is the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), known as the European 
 Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 6  The main human rights standard set by the European Union is the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights of the European Union (2000). 
 7  The main human rights convention of the OAS is the American Convention on Human 
Rights (1969). 
 8  The main human rights convention of the African Union is the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples ’ Rights (1981). 
 9  ASEAN Human Rights Declaration 2012. 
 10  Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004. 
 11  eg Universal Declaration of Human Rights, African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ 
Rights, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
 12  eg International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, European 
Social Charter (1961 and 1996), American Convention on Human Rights, Additional Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1999). 
 13  eg Convention Against Torture, International Convention for the Protection of All 
 Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
 Discrimination, European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1987), Council of Europe Convention on Action against  Traffi cking 
in Human Beings (2005), Council Of Europe Convention On Preventing And Combating 
Violence Against Women And Domestic Violence (2011), Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (1994), Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985), Inter-American Convention on Forced Dis-
appearance of Persons (1994). 
of specialised agencies such as Unesco 3 and the International Labour 
 Organization. 4 Additional — and largely overlapping in terms of content —
 standards have been set by regional and subregional organisations, in 
 particular the Council of Europe, 5 the European Union, 6 the Organization 
of American States, 7 the African Union, 8 the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations 9 and the League of Arab States. 10 
 In addition, human rights texts can be differentiated on the basis of their 
scope  ratione materiae . Comprehensive texts, aiming at a complete list of 
human rights, 11 coexist with texts that focus on one category of human 
rights — generally either civil and political rights or economic, social and 
cultural rights 12 — and single-issue texts. 13 
 Furthermore, with respect to their scope  ratione personae , some human 
rights instruments are universal, ie applicable to all human beings, while 
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 14  eg Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Pro-
tocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples ’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa 
(2003). 
 15  eg Convention on the Rights of the Child, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child (1990), Inter-American Convention on International Traffi c in Minors (1994). 
 16  eg Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
 17  eg Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities (1992), Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of 
national Minorities (1995), United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2007). 
 18  International Court of Justice ,  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ,  Advi-
sory Opinion, 8 July 1996 ,  ICJ Reports  1996 ,  226, at 254 ,  § 70. 
 19  eg the individual complaint procedures before some of the UN treaty monitoring bodies: 
the Human Rights Committee, the Committee Against Torture, the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimi-
nation, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances; also the collective 
complaint procedure before the European Committee on Social Rights, and the procedures 
before the African Commission on Human and Peoples ’ Rights and the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights. 
 20  Self-reporting followed by discussion of the report by an expert body may be considered 
the standard international human rights monitoring procedure on account of its wide use at the 
global as well as regional levels (Smith 2012: 154). 
others have a specifi c target group, eg women, 14 children, 15 persons with a 
disability, 16 or members of minority or indigenous groups. 17 
 Also, a distinction can be made based on the  legal force of the instru-
ments. While numerous human rights norms — constitutions, treaties, cus-
tomary law — are binding, human rights have also been included in formally 
non-binding soft law — eg declarations and resolutions — that may neverthe-
less have strong moral or political force, and even acquire, in the words of 
the International Court of Justice a  ‘ normative value ’ . 18 
 Finally, there is a great variety among the  monitoring mechanisms that 
accompany binding human rights instruments: these range from judicial 
control by supranational courts — the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights — to quasi-judicial control — individual complaints exam-
ined by expert committees 19 — to other forms of expert control and political 
 control-reporting procedures, 20 special rapporteurs, etc. 
 While each of these sources is internally coherent and each monitoring 
body has developed its own broadly consistent case law using its own inter-
pretation tools, the picture as a whole is rather complex. It is a reality of 
legal pluralism (Berman 2007), which can be experienced as a mega-mall 
in which rights-holders can go  ‘ forum shopping ’ , thus benefi ting from the 
diversity of norms, yet also as a labyrinth in which they — and their rights —
 may get lost. It is a polyphony that may produce a rich harmonious sound 
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that strongly gets a message across, yet may also be a cacophony in which 
we hear a lot of noise — or noises — but cannot distinguish a clear melody. 
 2. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 Academia has a tendency toward specialisation. As the fi eld of human 
rights law has emancipated, general human rights experts have largely been 
replaced by experts in, for example,  ‘ children ’ s rights ’ or  ‘ women ’ s rights ’ or 
 ‘ minorities ’ , or experts in the European Convention or the UN system, or in 
one specifi c freedom, such as press freedom or non-discrimination, privacy 
or religious freedom. While this has brought the discipline to a higher level, 
it has also contributed to creating a fragmented, compartmentalised view of 
human rights law. 
 I submit that our interest in the trees should not make us forget to study 
the forest. I argue that it is highly relevant for scholars of human rights law 
to study human rights law as an integrated whole: looking at, among other 
things, issues of consistency and alignment as well as divergence across the 
different layers of human rights law, at gaps in the overall protection sys-
tem, and at all kinds of cross-cutting or isolated dynamics. This is relevant 
both from a bottom-up perspective and from a top-down perspective. 
 First of all, the study of human rights law as an integrated whole is rel-
evant from the bottom-up perspective of the users of human rights law 
(Desmet 2014). When I use the term  ‘ users ’ of human rights law, I mean 
in the fi rst place the individuals and entities that are the subjects of human 
rights law, the rights-holders, who are at risk of potential violations, or who 
have already suffered violations. Yet I include under this term also the public 
authorities and other duty-bearers under human rights norms, because the 
point I want to make applies to them as well. The point is that users of 
human rights law are confronted simultaneously with all of these human 
rights provisions. To any particular situation, a dozen relevant human rights 
sources may apply. Hence, in my point of view, it is highly relevant to look 
at this complex human rights architecture through the lens of its users. This 
means that we should not just study separate human rights norms or mecha-
nisms, but that we should also pay attention to their simultaneous applica-
tion, and examine what that implies for the users of human rights law, and 
how these users deal with that reality of  ‘ internal ’ legal pluralism. 
 The study of human rights law is relevant also from a top-down perspec-
tive, in the sense that it resonates with some of the central principles of 
human rights law, in particular the principles of universality and indivis-
ibility of human rights. These two central dogmas of international human 
rights law appear to plead in favour of an integrated perspective of human 
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rights that takes into account all human rights norms relevant in a particular 
 situation; as well as taking into account the human rights of all rights-holders 
whose rights are affected by a particular situation. Universality means that 
all people have all human rights. Indivisibility and interdependence means 
that human rights are a package deal and that there is no hierarchy within 
human rights. Together, they require that all human rights should carry the 
same weight, and that they should be read together, strengthening each other. 
The reality of human rights implementation is, however, often far removed 
from these principles: cases involving multiple human rights are routinely 
examined through the lens of one human right only; and the invoking of 
multiple norms in a single situation remains the exception rather than the 
rule. 
1.  Inconsistencies within International Human Rights Law: 
The Case of Legal Pluralism 
 When one adopts this holistic, integrated view of international human rights 
law, one cannot escape the fi nding that there are a number of inconsistencies 
within international human rights law taken as a whole. Those may be the 
result of deliberate choice or instead the unplanned result of the uncoordi-
nated growth of international human rights law. They may create opportu-
nities for rights-holders trying to obtain human rights justice, as well as for 
human rights duty-bearers trying to duck their obligations. And they may 
carry a number of risks: the risk of suboptimal human rights protection, 
the risk of unequal standards of protection, and the risk of lack of legal 
certainty. 
 One such inconsistency concerns the attitude of international human 
rights law towards the recognition of legal pluralism, in the sense of an 
offi cial legal system making room for a system of  ‘ tradition-based law ’ , 
a term which I intend to cover indigenous law, customary law as well as 
religious law. As the discussion that follows will show, there is one layer 
or fi eld of international human rights law that considers state recognition 
of tradition-based law as mandatory and non-recognition as a violation 
of human rights (section 3.1 below). And there is another layer or fi eld of 
international human rights law that considers such state recognition of tra-
dition-based law as a violation of human rights (section 3.2 below). Human 
rights law as a whole thus at the same time mandates state organisation of 
legal pluralism and bans it. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the 
inconsistent attitude of international human rights law as a whole towards 
legal pluralism as a case study illustrating the dynamics and consequences 
of the internal plurality that characterises international human rights law. 
After discussing each of the above-sketched human rights approaches to 
legal pluralism in turn, we will examine the implications of this normative 
inconsistency. 
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 2.1. A Right to Legal Pluralism: Indigenous Peoples ’ Rights 
 The fi rst approach within international human rights law, mandating 
 recognition of traditional law, and hence mandating the recognition and 
organisation of legal pluralism by the state, is found in the universal 
regime governing the rights of indigenous peoples. This is laid down in 
ILO  Convention 169 (1989) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
 Independent Countries and in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (2007). 
 The ILO Convention grants indigenous peoples the right to retain their 
own customs and institutions (Article 8(2)), and mandates state respect for 
 ‘ the methods customarily practised by the peoples concerned for dealing with 
offences committed by their members ’ (Article 9(1)). Both provisions pre-
condition these rights on compatibility with national law and international 
human rights. In the same vein, the UN Declaration states that:  ‘ [I]ndigenous 
peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional 
structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, 
practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in 
accordance with international human rights standards ’ (Article 34). 
 At the universal level, and in the specifi c context of indigenous peoples, 
there is thus unambiguous recognition of a human right to traditional law. 
This is a collective human right that belongs to a people as a collective 
entity (Anaya 2007). It is a fully fl edged right, which entails both a freedom 
from interference as well as a number of positive state obligations. As is 
common in human rights law the freedom from interference that this right 
entails is not absolute. In particular, the drafters of these international texts 
on indigenous rights have foreseen that there might be situations in which 
the collective rights of indigenous peoples enter into confl ict with individual 
human rights — which may be the rights of individual members of an indig-
enous people or of individuals who do not belong to the indigenous people. 
Both texts give priority to the individuals ’ human rights in such situations. 
A number of positive state obligations that have been specifi cally included 
in the UN Declaration relate to the implications of a state recognising tradi-
tional law next to state law and organising a system of legal pluralism. They 
include the duty to resolve confl icts between legal systems, and the duty to 
give due recognition to indigenous law in a number of procedures of state 
law (Articles 27 and 40 UN Declaration). 
 In the fi eld of indigenous peoples ’ rights, human rights norms thus require 
states to recognise certain realities of legal pluralism and to engage with 
these realities. It has been argued that this is a signifi cant innovation in 
international human rights law, as it  ‘ challenges the primacy and sphere of 
state governing authority in a much more fundamental sense than classic 
individual rights ’ (Anaya 2007: 8). This is not a small thing, and its sig-
nifi cance is increased by the fact that the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
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 21  The Declaration was adopted with an affi rmative vote of 144 states in the UN General 
Assembly. Only four countries — the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand —
 voted against it, while Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Russia, Samoa and Ukraine abstained. 
 22  Until the entry into force of the 11th additional protocol to the European Convention 
on Human Rights in 1999, the Convention system was based on two bodies, the European 
Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Individuals did not have direct access to the Court, but had to apply to the Commission. The 
Commission issued decisions on admissibility and reports on the merits of cases. 
 23  ECmHR, application no 19628/92,  Bibi v United Kingdom ,  29 June 1992  (dec) . 
 24  ECtHR, application no 49151/07,  Mu ñ oz Diaz v Spain ,  8 December 2009 . 
 25  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), application no 3976/05,  Ş erife Yi ğ it v Turkey ,  2 November 
2010 . 
 26  ECtHR, application no 30882/96,  Pellegrini v Italy ,  20 June 2001 . 
Indigenous Peoples is one of the most recent normative human rights texts 
at the universal level, and that it was adopted overwhelmingly by the world 
community. 21 
 Yet these novel ideas that challenge the centrality of the state have not —
 as yet — penetrated all layers of international human rights law. As will be 
discussed below, in another room of the house of human rights, different 
standards apply, which not only do not mandate state recognition and 
organisation of legal pluralism, but which even go so far as to ban it, label-
ling it a human rights violation. 
 2.2.  A Ban on Legal Pluralism in the Name of Human Rights: 
The  Refah Case 
 This other room or other fi eld is that of the Council of Europe human rights 
protection system, and more specifi cally the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, applying the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The approach of the European Convention system to any human rights mat-
ter is an important fact within international human rights law as a whole. 
The European Court of Human Rights is the oldest supranational human 
rights court, it has by far the largest body of case law of any supranational 
human rights body, and it is based in a region with a long democratic tra-
dition. It is therefore not surprising to fi nd that the Court and its case law 
have become reference points within the global human rights project, also 
beyond Europe. 
 When it comes to the European Court of Human Rights ’ position on 
state recognition of legal pluralism, the relevant case law is not  extensive. 
There have been a number of cases in which the Court — or the former 
 Commission 22 — dealt with the consequences of legal pluralism, eg cases 
involving polygamy among immigrants in the UK, 23 Roma marriage in 
Spain, 24 informal Islamic marriage in Turkey, 25 or the enforcement in an 
Italian state court of a judgment of a religious tribunal of the Catholic 
church. 26 
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 27  ECtHR (Grand Chamber), applications nos 41340/98 41342/98 41343/98 41344/98, 
 Refah Partisi v Turkey ,  13 February 2003 . 
 28  The Court stated in general terms that  ‘ sharia is incompatible with the fundamental prin-
ciples of democracy ’ , and described sharia as  ‘ stable and invariable ’ , and claimed that  ‘ princi-
ples such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have 
no place in it ’ ( Refah judgment, para 123). These statements are at odds with how (Western) 
experts of Islamic law describe sharia, eg Otto (2011). 
 29  Refah Partisi v Turkey , para 28. 
 30  Such situations are rare in the Council of Europe Member States. An example, also relat-
ing to Islamic law, are the Mufti jurisdictions operating among the Muslim/Turkish minority 
in western Thrace (Greece). 
 Yet only one case addressed the recognition of legal pluralism and its 
relationship to human rights as such, the case of  Refah Partisi v Turkey . 27 
This case will be discussed in some detail in what follows, to the extent 
that it addresses the issue of legal pluralism. It is an important case, as 
it was adopted by a unanimous Grand Chamber of 17 judges. The case 
concerned the forced dissolution of a political party, at that time the big-
gest party in the Turkish parliament, on the ground that it was  ‘ a centre of 
anti-secular activities ’ . This accusation relied on three arguments, one of 
which concerned the allegation that Refah intended to introduce a system 
of legal pluralism in Turkey. The other arguments concerned the allegation 
that Refah would — within this context of legal pluralism — introduce sharia 
law in Turkey and the allegation that Refah members had suggested that 
they might use violence to reach their political objectives. 
 In the Refah judgment, the Court held in quite absolute terms that both 
the concept of institutionalised legal pluralism and sharia law as such vio-
lated human rights. Unfortunately, with respect to each of these far-reaching 
pronouncements, one cannot escape the impression that the Court did not 
rely on suffi cient expert knowledge and that it did not thoroughly think 
through the consequences of its rulings. Although a lot can be said about the 
Court ’ s inappropriate statements about sharia law in the Refah judgment, 28 
this chapter will focus on what it said about legal pluralism. 
 The allegation that the Refah party intended to  ‘ set up a plurality of 
legal systems ’ was based on two quotations from speeches of party leader 
Necmettin Erbakan: 29 
 There must be several legal systems. The citizen must be able to choose for himself 
which legal system is most appropriate for him, within a framework of general 
principles.  … The right to choose one ’ s own legal system is an integral part of the 
freedom of religion ’ . 
 and 
 When we are in power a Muslim will be able to get married before the mufti, if he 
wishes, and a Christian will be able to marry in church, if he prefers. 
 Hence the case did not address a situation in which a state actually rec-
ognises or organises legal pluralism. 30 Nor was there any concrete plan in 
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 31  Refah Partisi v Turkey , para 129. 
 32  ibid. 
 33  This is, for example, the case in India, which recognises several types of religious family 
law (for Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Parsi). See Solanki (2011). 
 34  cf the campaign for the recognition of Muslim personal law in South Africa (conducted 
amongst others by feminists), in a context that also recognises/regulates customary marriage, 
in addition to providing for civil marriage. See Amien (2010). 
 35  See Hoekema (2008: 3). 
 36  In Malaysia, for example, Muslims do not have the possibility to opt for the general leg-
islation that is valid for non-Muslims. See Hussain (2011: 380 – 81). 
this sense, as this issue was not included in the party ’ s constitution or pro-
gramme. Yet what matters for our purpose is that the Court saw suffi cient 
evidence of an intent in this sense, and expressed a clear opinion on the 
matter. The Court concluded that  ‘ a plurality of legal systems, as proposed 
by Refah, cannot be considered to be compatible with the Convention sys-
tem ’ . 31 In other words, in the eyes of the European Court of Human Rights, 
legal pluralism is by defi nition at odds with human rights. 
 The Court interpreted Refah ’ s point of view in a rather radical way, stat-
ing that: 
 [It] would introduce into all legal relationships a distinction between individuals 
grounded on religion, would categorise everyone according to his religious beliefs 
and would allow him rights and freedoms not as an individual but according to 
his allegiance to a religious movement. 32 
 That is a remarkable starting point, given the fact that neither the applica-
tion of legal pluralism to all legal relationships nor the categorisation of all 
individuals can be directly derived from Erbakan ’ s words. Practice shows 
that where institutionalised legal pluralism exists, it is generally limited to 
certain parts of the law, usually in the sphere of family law. 33 Moreover it 
may be organised in such a way that next to tradition-based law, there is 
a neutral option under state law, which can be opted for by believers and 
non-believers alike. 34 In addition, the same individual may rely for certain 
matters and in certain circumstances on tradition-based law, while prefer-
ring state law for other matters or at other times. This is the well-known 
phenomenon of  ‘ forum shopping ’ . 35 There are, however, systems that assign 
individuals to ethnic or religious categories without giving them such a 
freedom of choice. 36 I submit that this is a crucial variable in discussions 
about the recognition of legal pluralism from a human rights point of view. 
A mandatory system may offer stronger protection to collective cultural 
or religious rights, but appears hard to reconcile with individual human 
rights, in particular with autonomy rights and individual religious freedom, 
whereas no such a priori conclusion can be drawn with regard to a system 
that allows for free choice. It is therefore astonishing that the European 
Court of Human Rights entirely ignores the latter category, and appears to 
assume automatically that any system of organised legal pluralism must be 
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 37  Refah Partisi v Turkey , para 119. 
 38  Ibid. 
 39  cf Meerschaut and Gutwirth (2008: 433). 
a mandatory system. This is especially remarkable given the fact that the 
quotations from Erbakan that form the basis of the whole discussion seem 
to emphasise free choice. 
 In support of its conclusion that setting up a plurality of legal system 
is incompatible with human rights, the Court advances two arguments. 
The fi rst argument is about state monopoly of the law as a requirement 
for human rights protection (section 3.2.1 below). The second argument 
considers legal pluralism as inherently discriminatory (section 3.2.2 below). 
In what follows, the validity of these arguments will be critically assessed. 
 2.2.1.  State Monopoly of the Law as a Requirement for 
Human Rights Protection 
 In the fi rst place, the Court refers to the obligation of a state  ‘ to ensure that 
everyone within its jurisdiction enjoys in full, and without being able to 
waive them, the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention ’ . 37 The 
Court states that this role of the state would be undermined by a system 
of institutionalised legal pluralism, because  ‘ it would oblige individuals to 
obey, not rules laid down by the State in the exercise of its above-mentioned 
functions, but static rules of law imposed by the religion concerned ’ . 38 
 This argument is problematic. To start with, it is not clear what the Court 
means by  ‘ enjoy human rights in full ’ . The Convention rights allow for 
restrictions and the role of the Court is precisely to distinguish between 
acceptable and unacceptable restrictions. Restrictions based on religious 
rules are treated in the same way as other restrictions. What the Court does 
not take into consideration is that recognising legal pluralism, and in par-
ticular making room for religious law in this context, can be one way of 
striving for the  ‘ full enjoyment of human rights ’ . Indeed, institutionalised 
legal pluralism is regularly defended in the name of human rights; these 
may be collective rights of cultural or religious groups, but also individual 
rights, in particular the right to live according to the prescriptions of one ’ s 
religion. 39 From that perspective one might say that the organisation of legal 
pluralism does indeed fi t within the state ’ s role as  ‘ guarantor of individual 
rights and freedoms ’ . 
 In the Court ’ s reasoning, moreover, there appears to be no room for a sce-
nario in which rules of religious law are in conformity with human rights. 
Yet the practice of legal pluralism shows that there is no basis for the idea 
that the recognition of legal pluralism would automatically imply an abdi-
cation of the state ’ s obligation to protect human rights. Most individuals 
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 40  For examples, see Otto (2011) 
 41  Refah Partisi v Turkey , para 128. 
 42  The Court ’ s case law with respect to Turkey offers an example: the case of  Ş erife Yi ğ it 
v Turkey (see above) concerns the disadvantages suffered in the sphere of social rights by 
a widow whose Islamic religious marriage that was not recognised by the state authorities. 
This case illustrates that despite its lack of recognition, Islamic law is applied in Turkey in the 
sphere of family law. It also shows that discrimination of women results not necessarily — or 
not only — from the application of religious law, but may be the result of the state ’ s lack of rec-
ognition of religious law. The same point is made with respect to South Africa (Amien 2010). 
obey the rules of a number of non-state organisations, both in their private 
life and in their professional life. This does not undermine human rights, 
because human rights have been included in constitutions and international 
conventions, and are therefore on the top of the hierarchy of legal norms, 
which gives them priority over other rules. One of the reasons for a state to 
opt for the recognition of legal pluralism is precisely because it allows a state 
to enforce this priority. Recognition opens the door to regulation of norma-
tive orders that exist on the state ’ s territory regardless of recognition. Prac-
tice shows that a wide range of techniques are used by states to control the 
substance as well as the impact of sharia or other tradition-based legal sys-
tems in a context of legal pluralism. State law can restrict the spheres of law 
or the types of disputes to which sharia can be applied. It can codify sharia 
and in this exercise do away with discriminatory rules through amendment 
or interpretation. The state can also make secular judges responsible for the 
application of sharia rules, or it can provide an appeal procedure before 
state courts. 40 The Court rightly states that: 
 Turkey  … may legitimately prevent the application within its jurisdiction of pri-
vate-law rules of religious inspiration prejudicial to public order and the values 
of democracy for Convention purposes (such as rules permitting discrimination 
based on the gender of the parties concerned, as in polygamy and privileges for 
the male sex in matters of divorce and succession). 41 
 Yet it misses the mark when it assumes that this can be realised only by 
rejecting the recognition of legal pluralism. Instead the opposite is true. 
Throughout the world, tradition-based legal systems are applied on a large 
scale regardless of recognition. This means that there are cases in which 
an important goal such as the fi ght against discrimination may be better 
reached through recognition and control than by ignoring the reality of 
(unoffi cial) legal pluralism. 42 There can be no doubt that a state party to 
the European Convention that opted for the recognition of legal pluralism 
would be obliged to amend the religion- or tradition-based law it would 
recognise suffi cient to render it compatible with human rights. This may be 
compared to what happens when a state allows the private sector to organ-
ise issues such as education, healthcare or security. Privatisation of these 
human-rights-sensitive services is not automatically at odds with human 
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 43  Refah Partisi v Turkey , para 119. 
 44  cf the Court ’ s statement in the  ‘ face veil ban ’ case of  SAS v France (Grand Chamber), 
1 July 2014, para 119:  ‘ The Court takes the view, however, that a State Party cannot invoke 
gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by women — such as the applicant —
 in the context of the exercise of the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be 
understood that individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their own 
fundamental rights and freedoms. ’ 
rights, yet it requires the state to provide guarantees for human rights pro-
tection via, amongst other things, the legal instruments that govern such 
privatisation and through the exercise of control (De Feyter et al 2005). 
However, rather than giving states guidance on how to address the reality of 
legal pluralism in a way that optimises human rights protection, the Court 
chooses to present a caricature of legal pluralism that ignores the reality on 
the ground. 
 2.2.2. Legal Pluralism as Inherently Discriminatory 
 The other argument of the Court considers legal pluralism as inherently 
discriminatory. The Court states that such pluralism discriminates among 
individuals as regards their enjoyment of public freedoms and that it is not 
capable of maintaining 
 a fair balance between, on the one hand, the claims of certain religious groups 
who wish to be governed by their own rules and on the other the interest of society 
as a whole, which must be based on peace and on tolerance between the various 
religions and beliefs. 43 
 This is another example of the Court not taking into account the possibil-
ity that the institutionalisation of legal pluralism might be organised on 
the basis of individual free choice. It seems untenable to hold that there is 
discrimination against persons who choose to rely on Islamic law rather 
than state law, especially since such choice is the expression of their religious 
freedom, which is itself a Convention right. 44 
 Assuming that the balancing between religious rights and other human 
rights in a context of legal pluralism leads to different levels of human rights 
protection within the same state, the question arises whether this is unac-
ceptable in principle, as the Court maintains. In that respect it is useful 
to point out that other, widely accepted, institutional arrangements lead 
to the same result, ie different levels of human rights protection because 
of different legal regimes applying within a state. One can think in par-
ticular of the impact of federalism on the enjoyment of human rights. It is 
not uncommon in federal states that individuals enjoy different levels of 
human rights protection depending on where they happen to live. Same-sex 
 marriage is allowed in some US states but not in others, and the same holds 
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 45  Refah Partisi v Turkey , para 119 
 46  It is submitted that federalism and legal pluralism are not two entirely different things, 
but rather are part of a continuum of group-based rights concerning cultural/religious identity 
and self-determination. For example, for Kymlicka, both federalism and the recognition of 
tradition-based family law are types of self-government rights, which he considers to be one 
of three types of group-differentiated rights for cultural groups (Kymlicka 2005). It has to be 
acknowledged, however, that federalism is not always an expression of self-determination of 
cultural groups. 
for the death penalty. Likewise, teachers can wear an Islamic headscarf in 
some German  L ä nder but not in others. Foreigners migrating to Belgium 
have to take mandatory integration classes in Flanders, but not in Wallonia. 
Moreover, powers in a federal system are not by defi nition based (only) on 
territorial criteria. In Belgium, some inhabitants of Brussels are part of the 
Flemish community, others of the French community. If the Flemish parlia-
ment decides to ban religious dress in schools, while the French Community 
assembly allows such dress, children and teachers in Brussels would enjoy 
different levels of protection of their religious freedom depending on the 
language of their schooling. Would the European Court of Human Rights 
in that hypothetical situation also maintain that  ‘ such a difference in treat-
ment cannot maintain a fair balance between, on the one hand, the claims of 
certain [linguistic] groups who wish to be governed by their own rules and 
on the other the interest of society as a whole, which must be based on peace 
and on tolerance between the various [linguistic] communities ’ ? 45 
 Given the continuum between federalism and legal pluralism, 46 an a pri-
ori rejection of the recognition of legal pluralism on grounds of discrimina-
tion is not tenable unless one also rejects all types of federalism in which the 
power of the federated entities impacts on fundamental rights protection. 
 2.2.3. Opposite Approaches to Legal Pluralism 
 While the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in the  Refah 
judgment is vulnerable to criticism, it has undeniably strong authority. As a 
fairly recent judgment, which was adopted by a unanimous Grand Cham-
ber, it is not likely to be overruled in the near future. Hence international 
human rights law taken as a whole includes two diametrically opposite 
approaches to state recognition and organisation of legal pluralism. Within 
the universal system for the protection of indigenous peoples ’ rights, state 
recognition and organisation of legal pluralism is mandatory as a matter of 
human rights law. Yet within the regional system of the Council of Europe, 
state recognition and organisation of legal pluralism is considered to be 
by defi nition a human rights violation, at least if the broad statements of 
the Court in the  Refah judgment are to be taken at face value. In what 
follows, we will examine how to deal with this internal inconsistency of 
 international human rights law. 
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 47  This is linked to the fact that there are not so many indigenous peoples in Europe. Yet 
there are some, in particular the Sami in Scandinavia, the Nenet in Siberia, the Komi peoples in 
the Urals, and the Circassians in the North Caucasus. 
 2.3. Dealing with Inconsistency 
 Can international human rights law at the same time mandate the recog-
nition of legal pluralism and oppose it ? Do such internal contradictions 
threaten the sustainability of international human rights law and under-
mine its force and credibility ? In what follows, several lines of arguments 
that may be advanced to soften or nuance the normative contradiction we 
observed will be examined on their merits. 
 2.3.1. European Exceptionalism 
 One way of reconciling the apparently contradictory norms might be to 
state that Europe does not participate in the global consensus in favour of 
the recognition of legal pluralism. However, this point cannot be sustained if 
one looks at the positions of Council of Europe Member States with respect 
to the universal norms on the rights of indigenous peoples. Among the 22 
states that ratifi ed ILO Convention 169, there are four Council of Europe 
Member States (the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Spain). As for 
the UN Declaration, most Council of Europe Member States were among 
the large majority that voted in favour at the UN General Assembly. None 
was among the four dissenters and two states (Azerbaijan and Russia) were 
among the 11 abstentions. 
 Hence it is clear that the internal contradiction within international 
human rights law cannot be characterised as a divergence between a univer-
sal standard and a European standard. At least as far as indigenous peoples ’ 
rights are concerned, the Member States of the Council of Europe are part 
of the global consensus that supports a collective right to state-organised 
legal pluralism. 
 2.3.2. A Pragmatic Users ’ Perspective 
 Another way of solving the matter might be to focus on the fact that the 
universal norm applies specifi cally to indigenous peoples and does not take 
a position on the recognition of legal pluralism beyond that specifi c context. 
As there are not so many issues concerning indigenous peoples in Europe, 47 
and as these issues seem so far not to have included claims for the recogni-
tion of indigenous law, one might argue that in practice, at the level of the 
human rights users, actual confl icts between contradictory norms of inter-
national human rights norms do not occur. However, this position may be 
carrying pragmatism a little too far for most tastes. Moreover, even within 
Legal Pluralism as a Human Right  37
its pragmatic logic it may be problematic, as it relies on ostrich politics. 
Indeed, one should not exclude the possibility that any of Europe ’ s indige-
nous peoples might in the future claim recognition of some of its indigenous 
law. If the Sami of Norway claim recognition of their indigenous law, the 
Norwegian state would be legally bound under ILO Convention 169, and 
politically bound under the UN Declaration, to grant that claim. Yet at the 
same time, it would be prohibited from doing so on the basis of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court 
of Human Rights in its  Refah judgment. 
 2.3.3. Drawing a Line Between Religion and Culture 
 As a third option, one may consider a restrictive reading of the  Refah  ruling, 
focusing on the fact that the case is about religious law. The European Court 
of Human Rights manifestly does not want to make room for  religious 
groups to have their own norms, but, so the argument would go, it might 
think differently about norms based on culture and tradition as is the case 
for indigenous peoples. In terms of legal interpretation, that would be a 
stretch and a twist, as the Court ’ s arguments — relying on the importance 
it attaches to the state monopoly of the law and of equal protection of the 
human rights of all citizens — apply prima facie regardless of whether one 
deals with norms of religious or cultural origin. Yet such restrictive interpre-
tation is not unthinkable, as the language of the Court does refer to religion. 
However, from an anthropological perspective, drawing a clear line between 
cultural and religious norms would be hard to sustain. This is so on the one 
hand because  ‘ religious ’ rules are strongly intertwined with tradition and 
culture, and on the other because indigenous norms often carry spiritual 
and religious meanings. Hence an approach that relies on a black-and-white 
dichotomy between religion and culture would misrepresent reality and 
would therefore be viable only by resorting to manipulations that are not 
compatible with legal certainty. 
 2.3.4.  Distinguishing Minority, Majority and Indigenous 
Peoples ’ Claims 
 Another distinction that could be made between the rights of indigenous 
peoples and the  Refah case is that the latter deals with the rights of the 
majority population in Turkey. It may be argued that the claim for the 
accommodation of the cultural particularities of a minority group that has 
known a history of discrimination and whose traditions may be threatened 
with disappearance is much stronger than that of the members of the major-
ity culture or religion. This does indeed seem to be the overall tendency in 
international human rights law, in particular in the fi eld of culture, where 
the right to live according to one ’ s culture appears to be entrenched only for 
38  Eva Brems
 48  It could have argued, for instance, that this might create pressure to opt for Muslim 
personal law rather than civil law: cf its arguments with respect to the Islamic headscarf in 
a university context, in  Leyla  Ş ahin v Turkey  (Grand Chamber, application no 44774/98 , 
 10 November 2005 ) para 115. 
 49  cf Glenn ’ s category of the  ‘ chtonic legal tradition ’ , which includes both the law of indig-
enous peoples around the world, and customary law in Africa and Asia (Glenn 2004). 
minorities. Moreover, the overall layout of international human rights law 
also shows that among minority peoples, indigenous peoples are singled 
out for special protection to an extent that goes much beyond what is pro-
vided for minorities in general. Hence it might be argued that it is coherent 
to restrict the right to recognition of legal pluralism to indigenous peoples 
only. However, upon closer scrutiny this argument is quite problematic. In 
the fi rst place, this distinction does not have a basis in the  Refah judgment, 
which makes claims of a general nature. It could in principle have argued 
that the accommodation of Muslim personal law in Turkey would be unde-
sirable because it might affect the large majority of the population. 48 But it 
did not do so. Even if we place this fact between brackets and work with 
the hypothesis that in a future case based on an indigenous claim the Court 
might wish to distinguish that case from  Refah , it might be diffi cult to do 
so on the basis of presumed unique characteristics of indigenous peoples. 
While there are good reasons to differentiate between the rights of indig-
enous peoples and other peoples with respect to those aspects that relate to 
the distinguishing characteristics of indigenous peoples — in particular their 
relationship to their lands — such good reasons do not support all differen-
tiations existing today. When it comes to claims for the recognition of tra-
dition-based law, one cannot get around the similarities between indigenous 
law and customary law of minority — or indeed majority — peoples. 49 Would 
it then not be discrimination, as well as an affront to the principle of univer-
sality of human rights, to grant rights to recognition of legal traditions only 
to indigenous peoples ? By way of justifi cation for such unequal treatment, 
reference to a history of discrimination will not do, as many minorities that 
are not indigenous peoples have suffered similar histories, and as in many 
cases majority peoples would likewise be able to argue that their legal tradi-
tions were suppressed during colonialism. 
 3. CONCLUSION 
 When we analyse international human rights law as an integrated whole 
and focus on its pluralist nature, one approach may be seen as concentrating 
on drawing normative conclusions from such analysis, with a goal of opti-
mising human rights protection. From that perspective, I conclude that the 
normative contradiction highlighted in this chapter is indeed problematic, 
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as it cannot be explained in a coherent manner. Moreover the exploration 
of this contradiction pointed to an area that remains unresolved, namely 
the position of the universal human rights system vis- à -vis the recognition 
of legal pluralism in other situations than that of indigenous peoples. Cur-
rently, human rights law at the universal level is silent about this matter. As 
universal human rights law does not include obligations on the part of states 
to recognise customary or religious law in their rules on minority rights or 
religious freedom, there is no ground to claim that a right to such recogni-
tion currently exists. Neither is there a ground to claim that such recogni-
tion would be considered a violation of human rights. 
 A universal human right to the recognition of legal pluralism appears 
unrealistic and probably undesirable. Yet, as such a right has been recog-
nised for one category of peoples, international human rights discourse 
should be able to offer persuasive arguments justifying such privileged treat-
ment. Moreover, looking at international human rights law as an integrated 
whole, the position of the European Court on Human Rights on this issue 
is a problematic one, both because it is grounded on arguments that are not 
persuasive and because it creates contradictory obligations for some states. 
Should this position spread to the universal level — for all situations except 
those involving indigenous peoples — this would be even more problematic, 
as it would lead to blatant unequal treatment of similar cases. Ultimately, 
it appears important that all actors that play a role in the human rights 
enforcement machinery are well aware of the fact that they do not oper-
ate in isolation, but rather are part of a global project. Within this global 
project of universal human rights protection, refl ection is needed about the 
demarcation and the rules of the game to create a sustainable room for 
divergence and a space for bottom-up dynamics. 
 
 

